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Introduction 
The study of legitimacy in situations of conflict and peacebuilding has increased in recent years. 
Not only do scholars point to the important role that legitimacy plays in ending wars and 
building peace, but policymakers and donors have started to incorporate legitimacy 
considerations into their strategies and policies (Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2008; 
OECD-DAC 2010; DFID 2012). Both local and international actors and institutions view 
legitimacy as critical to the achievement of their objectives in the conduct of war and the 
construction of peace and therefore actively seek and use it in these settings.  
 However, there are two problems with current work on the topic. First, many 
assumptions, definitions, and understandings of legitimacy are adopted wholesale from classical 
legitimacy theory, which centers on the relationship between the nation-state and its citizens 
(Zelditch 2001; Weber 1978). While this literature provides many useful insights, the context in 
which it considers legitimacy differs markedly from situations of interstate and civil war and 
international intervention in fragile or post-conflict countries. These settings are characterized by 
a number of conditions not captured in other treatments of legitimacy: the absence or weakness 
of the state, the fluidity of power relations, rapidly changing contextual factors, and a constantly 
evolving set of actors. These factors imply that the actors interested in legitimacy, the sources of 
legitimacy, and its uses will be different as well. What legitimacy is and how it is generated, 
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maintained, and lost—that is, legitimation; what role it plays; and who uses or invokes it in 
active wars and post-conflict settings deserve specific investigation in light of these factors.   
Second, legitimacy in conflict has thus far not been studied in a systematic fashion. 
Individual contributions have been valuable to, for example, our understanding of local 
legitimacy in peace operations (Whalan 2013; Gippert 2016), how international organizations 
view legitimacy (Zaum 2013; Coleman 2007), or how they use legitimacy narratives in conflict 
and post-conflict situations (von Billerbeck, 2016). But we lack detailed analyses of the spectrum 
of theoretical, conceptual, and empirical legitimacy issues in and after conflict, the relevant 
audiences for legitimacy, its sources, and its impact (or lack thereof) on war and peace. In 
particular, we lack awareness and understanding of the trade-offs and dilemmas that legitimacy 
introduces in conflict and post-conflict settings. Far from constituting a panacea, legitimacy in 
these contexts is a contradictory and potentially conflictual concept with real implications for the 
possibilities for and strategies of peace and reconstruction, and indeed, nearly all such settings 
exhibit legitimacy deficits in some way.  
 This special issue on legitimacy in conflict addresses these two problems. In bringing 
together analyses of the various facets of legitimacy during and after conflict, it provides a 
comprehensive look at how legitimacy works in these settings and how it differs from the nation-
state context; how stakeholders and policymakers instrumentalize legitimacy in the pursuit of 
their goals; and how legitimacy can be assessed. In doing so it invariably highlights the 
dilemmas and associated trade-offs faced by policymakers and actors who use or seek legitimacy 
in the domestic or international context. It also makes a particular contribution in introducing 
wide-ranging empirical data to back up its questioning of how traditional legitimacy theories 
work—or do not work—in conflict and post-conflict settings.   
 In this introduction, we provide a detailed critical overview of current theories of 
legitimacy and legitimation and why they have only limited applicability in conflict and post-
conflict contexts. We then summarize the three main areas in which the articles included in this 
special issue challenge and contribute to those theories: audiences for legitimacy, sources of 
legitimacy, and legitimation. This introduction thus serves to bind the articles together and show 
the red lines of analysis that run through all contributions. It does not, however, prescribe one 
particular conceptualization of legitimacy. On the contrary, because the authors here each use 
their own conceptualizations of legitimacy and legitimation and address different audiences, 
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sources, and strategies of legitimacy, the issue as a whole is able to present a comprehensive 
picture of the diversity and special challenges of understanding legitimacy in conflict and post-
conflict settings, thus helping to expand and add subtlety to existing theories of legitimacy. 
 
Legitimacy in Conflict  
An inherently contested and nebulous concept, legitimacy is usually considered a 
characteristic of a hierarchical relationship between two actors marked by an inequality in their 
relative power. Most commonly, this is the relationship between rulers and ruled, usually in a 
state setting, and legitimacy in these terms relates to the accepted right of the ruler to rule or the 
duty of the ruled to obey (Coicaud 2002; Hurd 2007, 1999; Franck 1990; Hurrell 2007; 
Bukanovsky 2002; Gilley 2009). This judgment on the right of an actor to hold and exercise 
power and to demand compliance is based upon shared general norms of what is right or good in 
a particular state or society, and it is usually granted by a majority of the population, rather than 
an elite or any particular socio-economic group within the polity (Beetham 1991). 
Legitimation, however, is not a concern reserved to states alone, despite the fact that most 
legitimacy research has been done on states and most legitimacy theory built around them, and 
recent years have seen an increase in studies on legitimacy beyond the state. International 
organisations such as the United Nations (UN) or the European Union (EU) are concerned with 
their legitimacy standing in the eyes of their member states (Zaum 2013; Hurd 2007; Beetham 
and Lord 1998; Lord and Magnette 2004). Similarly, international peace operations seek to 
legitimize themselves in the eyes of several audiences, including domestic publics in the states 
seconding staff or providing funds, local populations in the host states, and key states who 
mandate the missions (often the UN Security Council) (Coleman 2007; Whalan 2013; von 
Billerbeck 2016; Gippert 2016b). While the recent shift in legitimacy studies away from a focus 
exclusively on the state shows an appreciation of the wider applicability of this relational 
characteristic, many of the theoretical and conceptual assumptions born out of the state-focused 
literature survive.  
Some of these features travel unproblematically between different legitimacy loci. For 
example, both the state-focused and wider legitimacy literatures can be broadly divided into two 
strands: those that assess subjective views of the legitimacy of an institution or actor (Weber’s 
Legitimitätsglaube, 1978) and those that evaluate the justification of that institution or actor’s 
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claim to legitimacy (Buchanan and Keohane 2006; Bodansky 1999). The first strand sees 
legitimacy as relational and subjective: an actor’s legitimacy depends on the perceptions of a 
relevant target audience and is based on that audience’s individual and collective normative 
benchmarks. The second strand holds that legitimacy can be objectively evaluated from outside 
of the legitimacy relationship itself: an actor’s legitimacy depends on whether it meets certain 
pre-determined standards. While of course any ‘objective’ standard for evaluating an institution’s 
legitimacy is based on certain normative benchmarks, often Western democratic ones (Zaum 
2013), how we define, understand, and conceptualize legitimacy still matters for how we 
evaluate it empirically. One of the papers in this special issue uses an objective standard for 
evaluation (Coleman, in part), while the other four papers employ a subjective understanding 
(von Billerbeck, Gippert, Whalan, Weigand). 
However, other key assumptions from the state-focused legitimacy literature do not travel 
into the other legitimacy contexts, particularly conflict and post-conflict ones. We highlight two: 
first, that power is institutionalized in the state and, second, that power is indivisible (Beetham 
1991; Zelditch 2001; Coicaud 2002). While both assumptions make sense in the case of a strong 
Western state, they are severely curtailed on numerous fronts in weaker states and, as is the 
concern of this special issue, in the context of war and post-conflict peacebuilding.  
First, an institutionalized view of power does not hold in most conflict and post-conflict 
settings, where power is not associated exclusively with the state, but is, instead, personalized 
and subjective. Florian Weigand’s article on domestic governance in Afghanistan exemplifies 
this dynamic. He shows how the Taliban have gained legitimacy among the local population by 
exploiting the government’s weaknesses and providing better local services. In particular, he 
demonstrates how the introduction of alien rule of law procedures into rural and tribal 
Afghanistan and the corruption and ineffectiveness of local government resulted in local 
openness towards alternative power structures.  
Easton calls this kind of support specific as opposed to diffuse (Easton 1965, 1975). 
While diffuse support is built over the long term as a result of socialization processes within 
polities, specific support is more short-term and changeable. In stable state settings, diffuse 
support predominates, and it is often taken for granted that power is distinct from the incumbent 
and from the personal views of the individual or party in office. Individual leaders and 
governments do not have to convince the population of their right to rule or the duty to obey, but 
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are instead accorded legitimacy by the fact that they acceded to the office following accepted and 
established procedures, act within the powers granted by the office, and fulfill the duties of the 
office (Beetham, 1991). Institutionalization thus fosters stability and continuity; equally, the 
stability and continuity of the state setting reinforces the view of power as institutionalized.  
However, as Jeni Whalan’s and Florian Weigand’s papers in particular demonstrate, this 
institutionalized view of power does not hold in many war or post-conflict settings. In the latter, 
the state may consist of fragmented elites and may not have meaning independent of its 
incumbent government, either because the state and its institutions are seen as alien constructs at 
odds with tribal, clan-based, or other social structures (Englebert and Tull 2008; Menkhaus 
2006) or because it is viewed as a prize to capture in order to seek rents. Under these conditions, 
legitimacy evaluations are not necessarily attached to the state but often to the numerous groups 
and individuals vying for power, in what Easton calls specific support. As this specific support is 
more short-lived and changeable than diffuse support, it negatively affects the stabilizing role 
that legitimacy can play in such contexts. Further, it means that we cannot equate the specific 
legitimacy of an incumbent group with that of the office they are currently holding. A weak 
group or individual that takes office during or after conflict may gain power but does not 
necessarily benefit from the diffuse legitimacy of the office; similarly, where a strong and 
legitimate group or individual takes office, it does not mean that their specific legitimacy ‘rubs 
off’ on the office of the state. This dynamic extends into the post-conflict period where again, the 
state may be weak or non-existent and linked strongly to the individuals who govern it rather 
than the office itself. In particular, even when a post-conflict government has been installed and 
fighting subsides or ceases, the personalized nature of power means that one cannot assume that 
there has been a wider acceptance of the legitimacy of the office.  
Second, traditional legitimacy theory assumes that power is indivisible (Beetham 1991) 
and attributes all power to the state (and equally, all obedience to the population), leaving little 
room for competing power holders or the division of different types of power among actors. 
However, power in most conflict and post-conflict settings is fleeting and fragmented, as 
Katharina Coleman´s and Whalan´s papers show with regards to international interventions. 
Indeed, conflict usually arises precisely because various groups are seeking to claim some or all 
of the state’s power, meaning that power is no longer contained exclusively within the state. As a 
result, the binary hierarchical relationships that are assumed in traditional understandings of 
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legitimacy do not usually exist. Political actors and alliances among them are fragmented, as is 
the population, and hierarchies are fluid, contested, and often unclear. The state may be so 
weakened that it cannot be assumed to hold greater relative power than other actors, and there is 
likely to be a plethora of parties asserting their right above others to legitimately hold power.  
While the limited applicability of state-based theories of legitimacy in turbulent conflict 
and post-conflict settings may not itself be surprising, to date few studies have provided 
empirical evidence to demonstrate this mismatch or to suggest where legitimacy theory needs 
further development. The contributions to this issue, however, do just that, and they employ a 
wide array of case studies and rich empirical data to demonstrate how several of the central 
tenets of traditional legitimacy theory often do not apply or lack nuance to adequately capture 
legitimacy relationships in these settings. Here, we draw out three of the main areas to which the 
articles in this issue make particular contributions in this regard: audiences for legitimacy, 
sources of legitimacy, and legitimation strategies.  
 
Legitimacy Audiences  
As described, legitimacy is a relational attribute, one judged to exist by one actor as a 
characteristic of another, but the binary relationships assumed by most legitimacy theories do not 
exist in the same way in conflict and post-conflict settings, thus complicating the way actors 
ascribe and seek legitimacy. Three broad categories of relationship are examined in this special 
issue: domestic, local-international, and international. Weigand looks at how legitimacy is 
generated and ascribed domestically in conflict settings, examining whether it is concrete actions 
by or the ideological orientation of the Taliban in Afghanistan that constitutes the basis for 
legitimacy judgments by the local population. Von Billerbeck, Gippert, and Whalan look at the 
local-international relationship, focusing on whether it is outputs—what international actors 
do—or procedures—how they do it—that garner the most legitimacy. Whalan stresses that the 
fragmentation of local actors makes it difficult for international interveners to generate 
legitimacy, while von Billerbeck notes that though local actors constitute one of the most 
important legitimacy audiences for international actors, the latter face multiple legitimacy 
imperatives and also need to satisfy other constituencies, such as donors and domestic publics in 
the home countries of states. Gippert zeros in on how the use of force affects legitimacy 
judgments. Coleman zooms out farther to look at all three audience groups, examining how 
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coalition composition legitimizes or delegitimizes interveners differently in the eyes of these 
different audiences.  
Importantly, all of the articles agree on two points. First, not only is there a particular 
proliferation of legitimacy audiences in conflict and post-conflict settings, but those legitimacy 
audiences are also exceptionally fragmented and variable about what constitute legitimate goals, 
actions, procedures, and norms, making it difficult for actors to both ascribe legitimacy and seek 
or claim it. As described, relevant audiences in conflict and post-conflict settings include the 
incumbent government, the often multiple parties to the conflict, the local population, 
international interveners like the UN or other coalitions, and the domestic publics of intervening 
states; each of these audiences is often further fragmented, particularly the national ones. As a 
result, as Whalan notes, even basic issues like whom international interveners like the UN speak 
to can be controversial, and agreement on appropriate goals and benchmarks is likewise fraught; 
the same is true of domestic power holders and government officials. This means that ‘there will 
be no one, single legitimacy’ in conflict and post-conflict settings (Whalan, this issue), and it 
may be more appropriate to speak of legitimacies. While most legitimacy theory relies on the 
idea of a common set of values or expectations governing the exercise of power (Coicaud 2002; 
Hurrell 2007), this shared basis for legitimacy clearly does not exist in conflict and post-conflict 
settings—in fact, it may be one of the root causes of conflict—thus underscoring the limits of 
those theories in these settings.  
Second, the contributions are aligned in their conclusion that the various audiences 
present in these turbulent contexts differ in how they ascribe and rescind legitimacy and the fact 
that legitimacy-seekers, in particular international actors, often struggle to gain legitimacy. This 
is, first, because they often have little knowledge of ‘how each [audience] conceives of 
legitimacy’ (von Billerbeck, this issue) and, second, because they have to juggle between the 
demands of multiple audiences or even the multiple demands of a single audience. As Coleman 
points out, most actors in conflict and post-conflict settings ‘fac[e] multiple legitimacy audiences 
simultaneously – and [are] constrained in how they accommodate each,’ because ‘the 
preferences of various legitimacy audiences may be incompatible’ (this issue). Von Billerbeck 
adds that even single audiences, like domestic elites for example, can have conflicting legitimacy 
demands. Even more basically, local actors may, as Whalan notes, have entirely different ideas 
of what constitutes a legitimate goal for an intervening force than the interveners themselves. 
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Gippert and Whalan, for example, both show that the link between effectiveness and legitimacy 
judgments is not clear cut: while Whalan points out that effectiveness can boost local legitimacy 
(and legitimacy can in turn boost effectiveness), Gippert demonstrates that the use of force can 
both boost and obstruct local legitimacy. More broadly, this implies that actions to seek 
legitimacy therefore may be completely misguided or at the very least fraught with trade-offs, as 
we discuss below.   
Legitimacy Sources 
In addition to demonstrating how conventional legitimacy theory fails to adequately 
capture the issue of audiences in conflict and post-conflict settings, this special issue also shows 
that those theories insufficiently explain how sources of legitimacy function in these settings. 
Numerous typologies of legitimacy sources exist. Weber identified three sources of legitimate 
authority—traditional, charismatic, and bureaucratic authority (Weber 1978). Others differentiate 
between procedural legitimacy and output legitimacy, where procedural legitimacy stems from 
the observance of known and accepted principles in decision-making (Hurd 2007; Tyler 1990, 
2006) and output legitimacy derives from the achievement of stated objectives or the fulfillment 
of specific needs (Scharpf 1999). Still others discuss source legitimacy and legal legitimacy 
(Whalan 2013, Roberts 2003).  
 The contributions to this issue assess a variety of sources from the perspectives of a 
variety of audiences to determine which are most relevant in conflict and conflict settings, in 
particular exploring procedural and output legitimacy and the trade-offs between them. Weigand 
and Whalan establish similar typologies at the outset of their articles, namely, coercion, 
instrumental or output legitimacy, and substantive or procedural legitimacy, and, like von 
Billerbeck, they focus on the latter two. While there are slight differences in how they define 
these categories, they are in agreement that they only take on substantive meaning when they are 
contextualized in particular settings with particular actors and it is only possible to assess them 
within such an empirical framework. For example, in the context of peace operations, Whalan 
points out that legitimacy in the eyes of local populations often derives from the effectiveness of 
the international interveners and that this effect is so powerful that it can in turn boost 
effectiveness, thus leading to a virtuous cycle; she cautions, however, that while this effect 
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makes sense theoretically, in practice, local legitimacy is extremely hard-won, and thus jump-
starting such a virtuous cycle is rare indeed.  
Though he examines a slightly different legitimacy relationship—between the local 
population and domestic authority figures in Afghanistan—Weigand similarly finds that it is the 
efficiency and perceived fairness of the quotidian interaction between these groups that leads to 
legitimacy judgments. Importantly, he observes that judgments about the efficiency and 
perceived fairness of authority are largely divorced from ideological considerations, but is based 
rather on consistency and equality, thus questioning the normative basis for much legitimacy 
theory, as described above. This contrasts somewhat with von Billerbeck’s finding that local 
actors often demand both norm compliance and effectiveness from the UN in the context of its 
peace operations and that the UN thus pursues legitimation strategies that emphasize both. Still, 
the norms in question in the case of peacekeeping relate to how the UN interacts with local 
actors and thus to fairness, equality, and participation, rather than a particular ideology, thus 
aligning with Weigand’s findings.  
In addition, von Billerbeck finds that sources of legitimacy can contradict one another. In 
particular, she notes that the legitimation strategies entailed by procedural and output legitimacy 
in the context of UN peacekeeping often come into conflict with one another, leaving 
legitimation strategies unclear or ineffective. Similarly, Gippert and Whalan note that 
international actors are forced to ‘choose between’ legitimacy sources, much in the same way 
that they have to ‘choose between’ audiences, and thus they end up compromising on all sources. 
Gippert and Coleman also introduce a temporal element to the question of sources. The initial 
legitimacy, to use Gippert’s term, of an external intervener may not be maintained by its actions 
further down the line, and Coleman notes that actors take enormous risks when they neglect 
particular legitimacy considerations early on based on the assumption that they will remain 
robust over time.  
There are three important broader implications of these analyses. First, unlike most 
legitimacy theories, which treat sources as discrete or at least not in conflict with one another, 
this special issue finds that legitimacy sources both overlap and contradict one another. As 
mentioned, both procedures and effectiveness may relate to the perceived fairness of actions and 
objectives, thus blurring the distinction between them, and leading, as von Billerbeck points out, 
to contradictions between sources of legitimacy. Because of this, those seeking legitimacy, be 
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they domestic elites or international peacekeepers, are often faced with trade-offs about how to 
legitimize themselves, and they often risk losing one kind of legitimacy by focusing on another 
(see below). In addition, actors may also lose legitimacy by ignoring potential variations in 
legitimacy perceptions over time. The overlaps, contradictions, and tensions in legitimacy that 
the authors in this special issue explore suggest that legitimacy is, while never easy to generate, 
even harder to generate in conflict and post-conflict contexts. More broadly, this sheds light on 
why nearly all such settings display legitimacy deficits among nearly all actors present and may 
be one explanatory variable in why they struggle to rebuild stable authority and power structures. 
Second, and relatedly, rather than finding that one source is valued more than another, the 
contributions to this issue find that the value of a legitimacy source depends on the audience, 
thus inextricably linking these two elements. Indeed, while much of the empirical data presented 
in the articles here suggest that local actors value output legitimacy above other sources, the 
authors all note that this may not be the case with other legitimacy constituencies. In other 
words, it is impossible to weigh the relative importance of various legitimacy sources without 
taking into account the empirical element of legitimacy—that is, the perspective of those to 
whom legitimacy matters and by whom it is judged. 
Third, as already suggested in our discussion of audiences, the relative importance of 
norms to legitimacy in post-conflict settings is more variable than traditional legitimacy theory 
suggests. Coleman recommends moving away from only the logic of appropriateness in 
understanding legitimacy to include both the logics of appropriateness and consequences (to use 
March and Olsen’s well-known distinction), and both she and von Billerbeck demonstrate how 
legitimation strategies are dependent on both normative and rationalist considerations. The 
variable utility of norms to understanding and assessing legitimacy does not imply that norms are 
not important, but rather suggests that, as described previously, they constitute a less reliable 
basis for understanding legitimacy in conflict and post-conflict societies because they are so 
fractured and contested in these settings. Outputs, including effectiveness and consistency of 
action, appear to constitute a more reliable and less subjective basis for understanding 
legitimacy, with norms and ideology constituting a secondary basis.  
 
Legitimation 
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Finally, the contributions to this special issue unpack how legitimation presents particular 
challenges in conflict and post-conflict settings that existing theories do not capture. Legitimacy 
is not an attribute inherent to actors or institutions, it is something that needs to be claimed, 
justified, and accepted in a process of legitimation (Suchman 1995; Hurrell 2007; Clark 2005; 
Beetham 1991). Actors and institutions may follow different strategies of legitimation depending 
on the audience they seek to convince (see above) and the resources they have at their disposal. 
While legitimation presents difficult choices in nearly all contexts, the authors here highlight two 
particular challenges relating to legitimation in conflict and post-conflict settings: using force 
and effectiveness.  
Force and legitimacy, not surprisingly, can be close comrades in situations of war and 
conflict, but scholars have taken different approaches to this question. Weber brought the two 
together, arguing that the use of force had to be legitimate (Weber 1978), while Arendt, by 
contrast, claimed that the use of force demonstrated that legitimacy does not exist, making any 
interaction between them impossible (Arendt 1958). The authors in this special issue take yet a 
different angle, demonstrating, paradoxically, that during and after conflict, force and legitimacy 
can both complement and undermine one another. Indeed, the consensus between the different 
empirical approaches and the different cases discussed by the articles shows that force and 
legitimacy are not simply parallel power mechanisms. While Gippert´s and Coleman´s articles 
focus on the local-international and the international level of legitimation, Weigand´s article 
shows the same applicability of the challenges identified at the domestic level in Afghanistan. 
Gippert’s article highlights how an international intervention’s use of force can reduce its 
legitimacy in the eyes of the local host state population; at the same time, the failure of 
interveners to use their coercive power to achieve their stated goals may also weaken their local 
legitimacy. In this way, international interveners face a dilemma, as it is not always clear in 
which direction the relationship between legitimacy and coercive force runs. Coleman’s article 
further elaborates on this dilemma in the context of the two international interventions in 
Afghanistan in 2001. She shows that in designing coalitions for both Operation Enduring 
Freedom (OEF) and the International Stabilization Force (ISAF), the United States was 
concerned with making the missions strong (in terms of coercive force) but not so strong that 
they would undermine local actors’ legitimacy perceptions (Department of Peacekeeping 
Operations, 2008). In this way, similarly to Gippert, Coleman demonstrates that the over-
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emphasis of coercive strength can undermine local legitimacy (OEF), but equally the ineffective 
use of coercive strength may also undermine local legitimacy (ISAF).  The relationship between 
coercive force and legitimacy is therefore not necessarily unidirectional.  
Weigand´s article demonstrates that the same dilemma applies to the domestic context. 
He shows that the use of force by the Taliban in their ideologically fuelled insurgency is 
considered illegitimate by much of the local population; at the same time, the effective, fast, and 
cheap justice dispensed by the Taliban contributes to local people’s legitimacy views of the 
group, rendering the relationship between legitimacy and coercion ambiguous.   
The second challenge raised by legitimation in contexts of war and post-war 
peacebuilding concerns effectiveness. There is a plethora of factors that contribute to the 
effectiveness of governance institutions, domestic or international, but legitimacy plays a 
particularly important role (Zelditch, 2011; Walker and Zelditch, 2003; Beetham, 1991). Von 
Billerbeck, Coleman, Gippert, and Whalan´s articles assess the effectiveness of international 
peacebuilding operations, while Weigand´s analyses the effectiveness of domestic institutions. 
Much of the literature on the effectiveness of international operations has focused on 
international factors, including the institutional constraints of missions themselves, their 
mandates, and the political will of the deploying states (Harland 2004; Stedman and Downs 
2002; Doyle and Sambanis 2006). Only recently has this focus broadened to include local factors 
such as the agency of local partners, local spoilers, and dynamics between local factions (Fortna 
2008; Stedman 1997; Whalan 2013; Gippert 2016; Pouligny 2006), showing the impact of local 
actors’ actions and attitudes on mission effectiveness. According to this more recent work, it is 
local actors’ compliance and cooperation with the mission’s activities that shape how effectively 
the operation can implement its objectives, and an international operation must be perceived as 
legitimate by key local actors in order for this cooperation and compliance to occur.  
However, the articles by von Billerbeck, Coleman, and Whalan demonstrate that local 
legitimacy and effectiveness are linked in a more circuitous way than some of this literature 
implies. Whalan shows that recognizing the importance of local cooperation and compliance is 
only the tip of the iceberg and actually securing them in practice is extremely difficult. She 
identifies three factors that contribute to the challenges of legitimation in post-conflict settings: 
the fragmentation of the local population and elites, as described above; contradictions between 
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how local and international legitimacy audiences understand and judge legitimacy and the need 
for international operations to satisfy both; and the foreignness of international interventions. In 
her article, von Billerbeck finds that the two sides of the dual character of the UN, as both an 
operational actor and a normative institution, require different legitimation strategies: the 
operational side of the UN needs to demonstrate its ability to deliver outcomes to legitimize itself 
(output legitimacy), while its normative side must show its adherence to specific procedures in 
its actions (procedural legitimacy). These two strategies often clash because efficiency may 
require cutting normative corners and vice versa and because different audiences have different 
expectations of the UN’s peacebuilding operations. Ultimately, international interventions will 
likely face trade-offs regarding which legitimation strategies to employ vis-à-vis which 
audiences. Coleman’s paper reaches a similar conclusion in her analysis of the Afghan context, 
showing how legitimacy perceptions of relevant local and international actors towards OEF and 
ISAF made them more likely to support the operation, which in turn increased the missions’ 
effectiveness. At the same time, she describes how actions taken by ISAF to increase its local 
legitimacy—specifically increasing the number of contributing states to the coalition—
negatively impacted the mission’s effectiveness, demonstrating that the relationship between 
effectiveness and legitimacy is not necessarily positive and instead, legitimacy can both increase 
and decrease effectiveness.  
  
Conclusion 
As this Introduction has described, the articles in this special issue make innovative and 
important contributions to our understanding of legitimacy in conflict and post-conflict settings. 
They challenge the applicability of current theories of legitimacy and legitimation, which usually 
take the nation-state and ruler-ruled relationships as their starting point, to the special 
circumstances of war and peace. In particular, they confront assumptions relating to the 
audiences of legitimacy, sources of legitimacy, and legitimation; they demonstrate how 
legitimacy and legitimation are fraught with trade-offs and dilemmas in these contexts; and they 
provide a wealth of empirical data to back up their claims. The authors bring diverse conceptions 
of legitimacy to their analyses, and they examine a variety of actors, including domestic publics, 
belligerents, governments, the UN, and other intervening coalitions; a number of sources of 
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legitimacy, both normative and output-oriented; and several different legitimation strategies, all 
across a variety of geographic settings, including Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Bosnia, and Kosovo. Yet despite the wide-ranging nature of the cases examined, the 
authors are remarkably unified in their findings that legitimacy functions in less explicit and 
often counterintuitive ways in conflict and post-conflict settings and, as a result, that it is a 
resource that is particularly difficult to come by in these contexts. The fact that the empirical data 
is diverse only lends greater weight and wider applicability to the overarching conclusion that 
current theories of legitimacy and legitimation require further development to hold up in conflict 
and post-conflict spaces.  
In this way, this special issue provides an empirical launch pad for further theoretical 
work. Indeed, as both scholars and policymakers continue to incorporate legitimacy 
considerations into their analysis of and strategic planning for conflict and post-conflict settings, 
as we described at the outset of this Introduction, a fuller theory of how legitimacy can—or 
cannot—be created in these contexts is increasingly important. By exploring the fragmented and 
conflictual characteristics of legitimacy audiences, the dilemmas and surprises relating to sources 
of legitimacy, and the often unexpected effects of legitimation strategies, these articles help to 
better explain the legitimacy outcomes observed in war and its immediate aftermath, most 
notably the fact that legitimacy remains remarkably scarce, whether in the eyes of domestic or 
international actors, despite explicit efforts to the contrary. In this way, this special issue 
constitutes a significant first step towards refining and developing current knowledge on 
legitimacy.  
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